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ELIJAH L. MILNE* 
INTRODUCfION 
The purpose of this article is to conduct a constitutional com­
parison of legislation and court decisions from nineteenth-century 
America that targeted the Mormon! practice of polygamy with state 
Blaine Amendments.2 State Blaine Amendments are provisions in 
various state constitutions that prohibit government support for 
"sectarian" schools.3 Many commentators believe that these 
amendments are a byproduct of the federal government's discrimi­
nation against Catholics during the nineteenth century,4 and argue 
that they are unconstitutional because of the animus they embody 
against the Catholic Church.5 This argument has come to the fore 
* M.A. Candidate, University of Utah; J.D., May 2006, Michigan State Univer­
sity College of Law; B.A., 2003, Brigham Young University. The author thanks his 
family for their love and support, Professor Frank S. Ravitch for his assistance, and 
numerous others, particularly Professor Adam Mossoff, for their suggestions and 
encouragement. 
1. Although members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints are 
commonly known as "Mormons," church members prefer to be called "Latter-day 
Saints." See The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Quick Facts, Glossary, 
Mormons http://www.lds.orglnewsroomlglossary/0,15400,3904-1-M,OO.html (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2006). This article will use, for the most part, the preferred terminology, refer­
ring to the Church generally as the "LDS Church." 
2. Polygamy is the practice of allowing either partner in a marriage to have more 
than one spouse. See polygamy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICfIONARY, http://www. 
merriam-webster.comldictionary/polygamy. Polygyny, however, is where only the male 
partner in a marriage has additional spouses. See polygyny, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ON­
LINE DICfIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/polygyny. The practice 
among early Latter-day Saints was in fact polygyny, not polygamy. Because the term 
polygamy is commonly viewed as synonymous with polygyny, this article will follow the 
more common usage. For consistency's sake, this article will also generally use the term 
polygamy instead of bigamy. 
3. See Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. 
L. REv. 939, 941 (1951). 
4. See infra Parts I, IlLB. 
5. See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. 
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particularly in the ongoing debate over government vouchers for 
private schools.6 Building upon the arguments of anti-Blaine 
Amendment commentators, this article suggests that if the Supreme 
Court ever holds state Blaine Amendments unconstitutional, laws 
targeting Mormon polygamy may also be unconstitutionaP This 
suggestion is founded upon the premise that, like state Blaine 
Amendments, nineteenth-century anti-polygamy laws were based 
primarily on religious prejudice.8 
Part I of this article sets out the history and circumstances sur­
rounding the enactment of state Blaine Amendments. Part II pro­
vides a history of early prejudice against Mormons, followed by a 
discussion of early laws directly targeting the Mormon practice of 
polygamy.9 Part III examines state Blaine Amendments and early 
anti-polygamy laws under the Supreme Court's current First and 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV presents 
potential arguments both in support of and against the constitution­
ality of anti-polygamy laws and state Blaine Amendments. 
LEGAL HIST. 38, 42-44 (1992); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the 
First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 657, 667 
(1998) [hereinafter Viteritti, Blaine's Wake]; Brandi Richardson, Comment, Eradicating 
Blaine's Legacy of Hate: Removing the Barrier to State Funding of Religious Education, 
52 CATH. U. L. REv. 1041 (2003). 
6. For further information about the history of government vouchers for "school­
choice" programs, see Private Education in the United States, MSN Encarta, http://en­
carta.msn.comlencyclopedia_17 41500929 _3IPrivate_Education_in_the_ U nited_Sta tes. 
html#p29. The debate over government vouchers has been somewhat silenced by the 
Supreme Court's adoption of the concept of "formal neutrality" in Zelman v. Simmons­
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). In Zelman, the Supreme Court allowed states to fund 
sectarian schools if the government's program was facially "neutral" and accompanied 
by a private-choice factor. Id. at 652-53. But see, e.g., House Set to Vote on ill-Con­
ceived, Divisive School Voucher Plan for Gulf Coast, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 18,2005; 
Supporters Rally Behind School Vouchers for Poor, N.J. RECORD, Dec. 6, 2005, at A23. 
7. This suggestion has also been made by Frank S. Ravitch in his article titled 
Locke v. Davey and the Lose-Lose Scenario: What Davey Could Have Said, But Didn't, 
40 TULSA. L. REV. 255, 264 (2004) (noting that laws targeting Mormon polygamy are 
unconstitutional to the extent that state Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional). 
8. See infra Parts II, I1I.A.3. 
9. This article specifically addresses "early" (nineteenth-century) anti-polygamy 
laws because of their apparent prejudice against the LDS Church and its members. 
Only to the extent that the justification for these laws was religious animus may they be 
compared to the so-called Blaine Amendments. Modern anti-polygamy laws mayor 
may not be based upon religious prejudice. To the extent that modern laws have "purer 
purposes," as explained in Part IV, they may well be constitutional. 
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I. HISTORY OF STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS 
A. Early Anti-Catholic Sentiment 
A basic understanding of the Blaine Amendment's history is 
necessary to reveal the prejudice against Catholics that is embodied 
in state Blaine Amendments. Blaine Amendments were the prod­
uct of "two related controversies: the public funding of sectarian 
education and the issue of religious exercises in the public 
schools."lo In the 1830s, immigration to the United States from 
predominantly Catholic countries rapidly increased.l1 Fearful of 
the increasing presence of foreign-born Catholics, many Anglo­
Saxon Protestants considered Catholicism a threat to American de­
mocracy and national identity.12 In reaction to this perceived 
threat, Protestants burned Catholic churches, raised mobs, and or­
ganized nativist political movementsP One such nativistI4 move­
ment involved the establishment of public schools.15 
Seeking to use public schools as a means of assimilating immi­
grants through compulsory school attendance, the Protestant ma­
jority required school children to read the King James Version of 
the Bible, sing hymns, and recite Protestant prayers-practices that 
many Catholics opposed.16 But "[b]y the middle of the Nineteenth 
Century, the Catholic population in America had increased suffi­
ciently to demand an alternative."17 In time, Catholics' petitions to 
10. Green, supra note 5, at 42. 
11. Id. One estimate states that more than 2.7 million immigrants from Ireland, 
most of whom were Catholic, entered the United States during the period of 1850 to 
1890. Richard G. Bacon, Rum, Romanism and Romer: Equal Protection and the Blaine 
Amendment in State Constitutions, 6 DEL. L. REv. 1,2 (2003) (citing KERBY A. MILLER, 
EMIGRANTS AND EXILES: IRELAND AND THE IRISH EXODUS TO NORTH AMERICA 569 
(1985)). 
12. Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: the Revival of 
a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 413, 418-19 (2003) (citing LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON­
PUBLIC SCHOOL 1825-1925 33-36 (1987)). 
13. Id. at 416. "[I]n the mid-1850s, Protestants burned a dozen churches in differ­
ent towns. In Sidney, Ohio, and Dorchester, Massachusetts, enterprising Protestants 
blew up churches with gunpowder. Riots between nativists and Catholic immigrants ... 
left numerous injured and dead in the streets." PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 217 (2002) [hereinafter HAMBURGER, CHURCH AND STATE]. 
14. Nativist movements organized in the 1840s and 1850s (such as the "Know­
Nothings") were essentially "groups opposed to the presence of foreigners and immi­
grants." Immigration, MSN Encarta, http://encarta.msn.com!encyclopedia_761566973_ 
3/Immigration.html#p29. 
15. Gall, supra note 12, at 416. 
16. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 5, at 666-67. 
17. Id. at 669. 
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state legislatures for funding of private Catholic schools achieved 
recognition and the government began to provide some funding. 18 
Such grants, however, "provoked a display of majoritarian politics 
of unprecedented brutality-all under the inverted banner of relig­
ious freedom. "19 In time, politicians throughout the country joined 
the anti-Catholic bandwagon.2o 
B. The Federal Blaine Amendment 
Following the Civil War, many nativist and Protestant activist 
who were alarmed by Catholic "challenges to the cultural and relig­
ious hegemony in America,"21 united in protesting all forms of gov­
ernment aid to Catholic schools.22 In response to pressure from 
these activists, on September 30, 1875, President Ulysses S. Grant 
called for an end to all "support of any sectarian schools."23 By so 
doing, President Grant "clearly aligned the Republican Party with 
the Protestant cause. "24 
In response to President Grant's invitation to end government 
aid to "sectarian" schools-an understood codeword for "Catho­
lic"25-Congressman James G. Blaine volunteered to further the 
President's stated objectives.26 With full cognizance of the Presi­
18. Gall, supra note 12, at 42l. 
19. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 5, at 669 ("When Bishop Hughes of New 
York entered the fray in 1842 to demand public support for Catholic schools, his resi­
dence was destroyed .... When Catholics in Michigan proposed a similar school bill in 
1853, opponents portrayed their plan as a nation-wide plot hatched by Jesuits ...."). 
20. Id. 
21. Green, supra note 5, at 47. 
22. Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of 
Religious Freedom, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 299, 310-11 (2003) [hereinafter Viter­
itti, Davey's Plea] (citing RAy ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800­
1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM (1938); JOHN HIGHAM, 
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (1963». 
23. Green, supra note 5, at 47 (emphasis added). 
24. Id. at 48. "The Blaine Amendment was the direct result of Republican at­
tempts to gain political mileage from a growing public concern over Catholic and immi­
grant inroads into American culture." Id. at 69. 
25. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (At the time the federal Blaine 
Amendment was considered, "it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Cath­
olic.' .. , [T]he term 'pervasively sectarian' ... at that time, could be applied almost 
exclusively to Catholic parochial schools ...."). 
26. Blaine drafted and submitted his proposed amendment to Congress within a 
matter of weeks after Grant had invited listeners to 
[e]ncourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar, appropriated for 
their support, shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian schools. 
Resolve that neither the State nor Nation, nor both combined shall support 
institutions of learning other than those sufficient to afford to every child 
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dent's motives, and in an effort to strengthen his own future bid for 
the Republican Party's presidential nomination as a candidate op­
posed to "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion,"27 Blaine drafted the 
following proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of relig­
ion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised 
by taxation in any State for the support of public schools or de­
rived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted 
thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect or 
denomination; nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted 
be divided between religious sects or denominations.28 
While the Blaine Amendment easily passed the House by a 
vote of 180 to 7,29 the Senate subsequently criticized the Amend­
ment as being founded on fears of "imperial papacy."30 Although 
the Senate Judiciary Committee revised the proposed Amendment 
so that it would "not be construed to prohibit the reading of the 
Bible in any school or institution,"31 the Amendment failed by a 
mere two votes.32 
C. State Blaine Amendments 
After the defeat of the federal Blaine Amendment on the Sen­
ate floor, proponents of the Blaine Amendment looked to the 
states for assistance.33 Because of the prevalent anti-Catholic senti­
ment at the time, nativist Protestants succeeded in securing versions 
growing up in the land the opportunity of a good common school education, 
unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas. 
Green, supra note 5, at 47 (emphasis added). 
27. Coincidentally, some historians say Blaine initially believed his party's plat­
form in 1884 was opposed to "Rum, Mormonism, and Rebellion." MARK W. SUMMERS, 
RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION: THE MAKING OF A PRESIDENT, 1884 58 (2000). In all 
fairness to Blaine, however, it must be said that in 1890, while serving as Secretary of 
State for President Benjamin Harrison, Blaine was friendly toward the Latter-day 
Saints and urged politicians to "not try to stamp out individual belief through persecu­
tion." THOMAS G. ALEXANDER, THINGS IN HEAVEN AND EARTH: THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF WILFORD WOODRUFF, A MORMON PROPHET 251, 265 (1991). 
28. Meyer, supra note 3, at 941 (citing 4 CONGo REC. 5580 (1876». 
29. HAMBURGER, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 13, at 325. 
30. Green, supra note 5, at 67. 
31. Id. at 60. The fact that the Blaine Amendment was revised so as to not pro­
hibit the reading of the Bible in public schools serves as further evidence that the real 
purpose of the Amendment was not to protect the separation of church and state, but 
rather to protect the state from a specific church (the Catholic Church), while still al­
lowing Protestantism to permeate public schools. 
32. HAMBURGER, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 13, at 325. 
33. See id. at 338-39. 
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of the Blaine Amendment in a majority of state constitutions.34 
While some states voluntarily added "baby Blaine" provisions to 
their constitutions, the federal government forced many states to 
adopt Blaine-like Amendments as a prerequisite for obtaining 
statehood.35 
Today, forms of the Blaine Amendment exist in most state con­
stitutions, but state Blaine Amendments differ in restrictiveness.36 
At least twenty-seven states still explicitly bar government aid to 
"sectarian" institutions.37 Not only do Blaine-like provisions con­
tinue to inhibit the ability of Catholics to send their children to 
Catholic-owned schools, they also serve as a powerful roadblock to 
all advocates of "school choice. "38 
34. Id. In 1941, it was reported that "[t]he constitutions of forty-six of the United 
States, thirty-seven of them by explicit reference to sectarian institutions, prohibit the 
appropriation of public money to schools controlled by religious organizations." Note, 
Catholic Schools and Public Money, 50 YALE L.J. 917, 917 (1941) (emphasis added). 
But today, all states in the Union, except for the following eleven, are said to have a 
Blaine-like provision in their individual constitutions: Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisi­
ana, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, 
and West Virginia. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Blaine Amendments: 
States, http://www.blaineamendments.orglstates/states.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
35. See Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 5, at 674-75. Among those states re­
quired to adopt Blaine Amendments for admission to the Union were the following: 
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. David K. Kirkpatrick, The Pain of Blaine (Amend­
ments) Is On the Wane?, U.S. FREEDOM FOUNDATION, August 7, 2003, http://www.free­
domfoundation.uslblaine_amendments_parC3. Interestingly, members of the LDS 
Church helped settle several of these states. See LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, GREAT BA­
SIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830-1900 43 
(Univ. of Utah 1993) (1958). 
36. See state constitutional provisions cited infra note 37. 
37. But see The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 34 (claiming there 
are thirty-seven states with such explicit prohibitions). While the current state constitu­
tions of Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah each contain Blaine-like provisions 
(inasmuch as they prevent funding for religious organizations), they do not expressly 
discriminate against "sectarian" groups. See FLA. CaNsT. art I, § 3; IND. CaNST. art. I, 
§ 6; IOWA CaNST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CaNsT. art. 6, § 6(c); MASS. CaNST. art. XVIII, § 2; 
MICH. CaNST. art. VIII, § 2; N.H. CaNsT. art. 83; N.Y. CaNsT. art. XI, § 3; OHIO CaNsT. 
art. 6, § 2; OR. CaNST. art. I, § 5; S.c. CaNsT. art. XI, § 4; UTAH CaNST. art. X, § 9. 
However, the constitutions of Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
Ohio do mention aid to "sects." 
38. Gall, supra note 12, at 414; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (discuss­
ing government vouchers for private schools); George F. Will, Choice Under Fire, Yet 
Again, NEWSWEEK, June 20, 2005, at 74. This article employs the term "school choice" 
throughout solely in the context of voucher programs by which public funds may be 
used at private schools. Although the Supreme Court recently held that the Establish­
ment Clause does not necessarily prevent states from providing funds to private relig­
ious schools, state courts have held that their Blaine-like Amendments provide added 
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II. HISTORY OF MORMON POLYGAMY 
A. Early Anti-Mormon Sentiment 
Like Catholicism, early Mormonism faced vigorous opposition. 
Outsiders regularly viewed Latter-day Saints and their Catholic 
counterparts with disdain.39 Unlike Catholics, Latter-day Saints 
were often persecuted for engaging in polygamy. Polygamy, how­
ever, was not the sole basis of animosity against the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints ("LDS Church"). In fact, Latter-day 
Saints were persecuted long before the LDS Church adopted the 
practice of polygamy.4o 
Soon after the LDS Church's organization in upstate New 
York on April 6, 1830, early adherents of the Mormon faith, unable 
to endure the prejudices of their neighbors, sought refuge in Ohio 
and Jackson County, Missouri.41 The Latter-day Saints' stay in 
Ohio and Jackson County, Missouri was short-lived, however. 
Within a period of eight years, persecutions drove the entire body 
of the Church temporarily into northwestern Missouri.42 
Within approximately one year of their arrival in northwestern 
Missouri, Governor Lilburn W. Boggs issued the following order to 
the state's militia: "The Mormons must be treated as enemies, and 
must be exterminated or driven from the State if necessary for the 
public good."43 Authorities in Missouri complied with the Gover­
protection against government involvement with religion. For cases where the Supreme 
Court has upheld the use of state funds in connection with private religious schools, see, 
e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that Ohio's Pilot Project 
Scholarship Program did not offend the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause did not 
prevent state from supplying deaf student at Catholic school with sign-language inter­
preter); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that 
aid for student with progressive eye condition did not violate Establishment Clause, 
even though student attended a private Christian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388 (1983) (holding that a tax deduction for the parents of children attending parochial 
schools was not contrary to the Establishment Clause). 
39. See David Brion Davis, Some Themes of Counter-Subversion: An Analysis of 
Anti-Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature, MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV., 
Sept. 1960, at 205, 207-08 (stating that "the lines separating ... Catholic[] and Mormon 
became almost indistinguishable," so that, "as imagined enemies [of Protestants] they 
merged into a nearly common stereotype"). 
40. See generally CHURCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, CHURCH HISTORY IN THE FULNESS OF TIMES 30 (2d 
ed. 2003) (describing early persecutions of Latter-day Saints). 
41. See id. at 90, 130-34. 
42. Id.; see also GEORGE Q. CANNON, LIFE OF JOSEPH SMITH THE PROPHET 258­
81 (1986). 
43. RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, JOSEPH SMITH: ROUGH STONE ROLLING 365 
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nor's "extermination order" by forcing the Latter-day Saints out of 
Missouri and into Illinois in the midst of winter.44 Hostile vigilantes 
and state militias burned the Saints' Missouri homes and fields, 
massacred their people, violated their women and children, and im­
prisoned their leaders.45 Just five short years after driving the Lat­
ter-day Saints from Missouri to Illinois, similar mobs forced the 
Latter-day Saints out of Illinois.46 In 1846, after concluding that the 
federal government and the various states were unwilling to offer 
them any protection,47 the Latter-day Saints, led by Brigham 
Young,48 commenced the arduous trek west to the Rocky Moun­
tains.49 On July 24, 1847, the first Mormon caravan entered what 
was then a part of northern Mexico, but is today Salt Lake City, 
Utah.50 
B. State and Federal Attacks on Mormon Polygamy 
In October 1843, less than a year before his death, Joseph 
Smith Jr., founder of the LDS Church, taught Latter-day Saints that 
"[nlo man shall have but one wife at a time, unless the Lord directs 
otherwise."51 In spite of these teachings, Smith and other promi­
nent leaders of the Church had already secretly entered into "plural 
marriages."52 Indeed, on July 12, 1843, Smith had received an "in­
(2005) (quoting a letter from Lilburn W. Boggs, Governor, State of Missouri, to John B. 
Clark, General, State Militia, Missouri (Oct. 27, 1838». 
44. See CANNON, supra note 42, at 258-81; see also Elise Soukup, The Mormon 
Odyssey, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 17,2005, at 52-60. 
45. See CANNON, supra note 42, at 258-81; BUSHMAN, supra note 43, at 365-68. In 
1976, Missouri Governor Christopher S. Bond rescinded the 128-year-old extermination 
order and expressed "'deep regret for the injustice and undue suffering which was 
caused by the 1838 order.''' RICHARD NEITZEL HOLZAPFEL & T. JEFFERY COTILE, 
OLD MORMON KIRTLAND AND MISSOURI 238-85, 306 (1991). 
46. JAMES A. LITTLE, FROM KIRTLAND TO SALT LAKE CITY 42 (1890). The State 
of Illinois passed a resolution in 2004 expressing" 'official regret' for the violence and 
state-sanctioned condemnation that caused the Mormons to leave" Illinois in 1846. Me­
lissa Sanford, Illinois Tells Mormons It Regrets Expulsion, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at 
A26. 
47. According to one historian, "the only law the Mormons found was lynch law." 
Orma Linford, The Mormons, the Law, and the Territory of Utah, 23 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 213, 217 (1979). 
48. While many nineteenth-century writers observed the similarities between the 
Catholic and Mormon hierarchies, some claimed that Brigham Young "out-popes the 
Roman." Davis, supra note 39, at 207. 
49. LITILE, supra note 46, at 42. 
50. LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, BRIGHAM YOUNG: AMERICAN MOSES 146 (1985). 
51. JOSEPH FIELDING SMITH, TEACHINGS OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH SMITH 324 
(1989). 
52. RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 19,21 (2d 
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spired revelation" justifying the practice. 53 Church leaders, how­
ever, did not share this revelation with the Church's general 
membership until several years after Smith presented it.54 In fact, 
the Church did not officially announce its belief in polygamy until 
August 29, 1852-over five years after the Mormon pioneers had 
become established in present-day Utah.55 
Despite widespread belief, "the Mormon harem, dominated by 
lascivious males with hyperactive libidos, did not exist."56 While 
most male Latter-day Saints remained monogamous,57 those who 
practiced polygamy generally married only one additional wife.58 
As one commentator observed, "Mormon plural marriage, dedi­
cated to propagating the species righteously and dispassionately, 
proved to be a rather drab lifestyle compared to the imaginative 
tales of polygamy, dripping with sensationalism, demanded by a 
scandal-hungry eastern media market. "59 In contrast to the wide­
spread perception to the contrary, Latter-day Saints saw plural mar­
riage not as a means of "pleas[ing] man in his carnal desires," but 
rather as a divine commandment.60 Evidence of polygamy in the 
Old Testament, as well as a reverence for the teachings of the Lat­
ter-day Saints' modern prophets formed the basis of this belief.61 
While no federal anti-polygamy law existed prior to the time 
the LDS Church announced its belief in polygamy, opposition to 
the practice quickly grew.62 In 1856, four years after the LDS 
Church endorsed polygamy, the Republican Party called for the ab­
olition of "those twin relics of barbarism-Polygamy and Slavery" 
in the territories.63 Nevertheless, it was not until July 1, 1862, that 
ed. 1989) (offering what is perhaps the most extensive study of the history of Mormon 
polygamy). 
53. See DOcrRINE AND COVENANTS 132:1-66. 
54. See GORDON B. HINCKLEY, TRUTH RESTORED: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE 
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 129 (1979). 
55. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 85. 
56. Id. at 89. 
57. One source estimates that only five percent of male Latter-day Saints (most 
of whom were church leaders) maintained polygamous households. Id. at 103. Other 
sources suggest that the number may have been as low as three percent. Id. 
58. Id. at 91. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 89 (quoting Brigham Young). 
61. See Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Consti­
tutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise 
Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 707-08 (2001) (recognizing that "[a] number of Old 
Testament patriarchs had multiple wives"). 
62. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 105. 
63. JAMES B. ALLEN & GLEN M. LEONARD, THE STORY OF THE LATTER-DAY 
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Congress enacted the first federal legislation prohibiting polygamy: 
the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act.64 Under the Morrill Act, the forma­
tion of polygamous relationships was a federal crime, punishable by 
imprisonment for up to five years.65 The Act also annulled all laws 
of the Territory of Utah that countenanced polygamy or "spiritual 
marriage, however disguised by ... ecclesiastical solemnities, sacra­
ments, ceremonies, [or] consecrations."66 Thus, the Act expressly 
targeted, inter alia, "spiritual marriage."67 
Although the Civil War and Reconstruction delayed enforce­
ment of the Morrill Act,68 Congress passed the Poland Act69 on 
June 23, 1874, "which set the stage for enforcement of the anti-po­
lygamy law by making procedural adjustments in the territorial ju­
diciary."7o Soon thereafter, George Reynolds, Brigham Young's 
SAINTS 297 (1976). The Republicans, however, lost the 1856 election to Democratic 
candidate James Buchanan. [d. Soon after his inauguration, President Buchanan or­
dered 2,500 troops to the Utah Territory-not to halt polygamy, but to tame the mas­
sive political power, or "despotism," of territorial-Governor Brigham Young. Richard 
D. Poll & Ralph W. Hansen, Buchanan's Blunder: The Utah War, 1857-1858, MILITARY 
AFFAIRS, Autumn 1961, at 121. "'The community and, in part, the civil government of 
Utah Territory,''' said General Winfield Scott, "'are in a state of substantial rebellion.''' 
Id. Concerning this matter, one commentator observed, "Although Americans waged 
an intense legal and social battle over polygamy, their real concern was the perceived 
power of the Mormon Church and the belief that Mormons wished to establish a ne­
otheocracy." Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Disso­
nance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy As a Case Study Negating the Belief­
Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1295, 1311 (1998). 
64. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 1978). The fact that 
Congress waited nearly fifteen years after the Latter-day Saints entered Utah and 
nearly ten years after the LDS Church recognized polygamy before adopting the first 
federal anti-polygamy law suggests that the federal government was not overly con­
cerned about polygamy per se. Rather, it seems that the government may have used 
polygamy merely to vent its deeper frustrations with the LDS Church and its 
leadership. 
65. [d. 
66. Id. Congress perhaps believed it necessary to refer to Mormon polygamy as 
"spiritual marriage" because of the Latter-day Saints' custom of calling their marriages 
"sealings." See BUSHMAN, supra note 43, at 325 (stating that sealing is "Mormon lan­
guage for marriage"). 
67. 12 Stat. at 501. 
68. The American Civil War began on April 12, 1861, and ended on May 26, 1865. 
Civil War, MSN Encarta, http://encarta.msn.comlencyciopedia_761567354/Civil_War_ 
American.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2006). Reconstruction lasted from the end of the 
Civil War until about 1877. Reconstruction, MSN Encarta, http://encarta.msn.comlency­
clopedia_7615566421Reconstruction_(U_S_history).html . Because of the Union's in­
volvement in the War and its all-consuming interest in rebuilding the nation, the 
"Mormon question" was effectively put on the back burner from 1862 to 1874. Id. 
69. Act of July 23, 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253 (1874). 
70. Ray Jay Davis, The Polygamous Prelude, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, at 6 (1962). 
The Poland Act "gave U.S. district courts in Utah exclusive civil and criminal jurisdic­
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personal secretary, was indicted for, and convicted of, bigamy under 
the Morrill Act.11 In 1878, Reynolds's case came before the U.S. 
Supreme Court for consideration.72 
Upholding both Reynolds's conviction and the constitutional­
ity of the Morrill Act, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that 
"[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and west­
ern nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon 
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of 
African people. "73 In addition to its opinion about the geographic 
and racial origins of polygamy, the Court explained, "Laws are 
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot inter­
fere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with prac­
tices. "74 Thus, in Reynolds, the Court first articulated the belief/ 
practice dichotomy that continues to dominate its free-exercise 
jurisprudence.75 
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Reynolds, the Morrill 
Act had little effect on the Latter-day Saints beyond strengthening 
their resolve to obey the laws of their religion before those of their 
country.76 To add teeth to the Morrill Act, on March 22,1882, Con­
gress passed the Edmunds Act.77 The Edmunds Act laid "legal 
groundwork for court action against Mormons not only for the diffi­
cult-to-prosecute offense of polygamy but also for the more easily 
tion." V AN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 110. This procedural adjustment shifted "en­
forcement of the Morrill Act from local (and more often than not, Mormon) judges to 
federal appointees." Sealing, supra note 61, at 703. 
71. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 110. 
n. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
73. Id. at 164; see Sealing, supra note 61, at 716 ("It is not too much to suggest, in 
the context of the racist sentiment of the time, that [this] statement contains a thinly 
veiled racist implication."). 
74. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. "Behind its legal sophistication, the majority opin­
ion in Reynolds displayed a disdain for the Mormon church that bordered on con­
tempt." Todd M. Gillett, The Absolution ofReynolds: The Constitutionality of Religious 
Polygamy, 8 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 497, 514 (2000). 
75. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 
107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (citing Reynolds and reaffirming the belief/practice di­
chotomy in the free-exercise context). 
76. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 111; see ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 239. 
The leaders of the LDS Church "called on the Lord to 'protect thy Church, thy King­
dom and thy people from the power of the wicked'" and "inhibit the nation from 
preventing 'thy Saints from keeping thy Commandments.'" Id. 
77. Edmunds (Polygamy) Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (repealed 1983). The 
Supreme Court later upheld the Edmunds Act in Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 
(1885). 
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substantiated 'unlawful cohabitation.' "78 As a result of the Ed­
munds Act, the government no longer had to prove the existence of 
a legal marriage to substantiate bigamy charges, but instead had 
only to show that the defendants unlawfully cohabitated with one 
another.79 
In addition to those who practiced "unlawful cohabitation," 
the Edmunds Act targeted individuals who "believe[dJ it right for a 
man to have more than one living . . . wife at the same time. "80 
Thus, the Edmunds Act expressly targeted, inter alia, belief-based 
polygamy.81 Recognizing this, one commentator observed that the 
anti-polygamy laws "did not criminalize informal sexual relations 
between men and women, nor did they require any proof of sexual 
intimacy for criminal conviction. Rather, the laws attacked a mari­
tal system that prima facie challenged the notion that monogamy 
was the only acceptable social form of marriage."82 
On March 3, 1887, less than five years after the passage of the 
Edmunds Act, Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act.83 The 
purpose behind the Edmunds-Tucker Act, according to one com­
mentator, was "to destroy the Mormon theocratic system."84 Spe­
cifically, the Edmunds-Tucker Act disfranchised all polygamists and 
made all marriages that were not publicly recorded a felony.85 In 
addition, the Edmunds-Tucker Act threatened "to dissolve the legal 
entity of the church corporation and to confiscate all church prop­
erty in excess of $50,000."86 
Soon after passing the Edmunds-Tucker Act, the federal gov­
78. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 117; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 
235-36,239 (explaining the objectives and ramifications of the Edmunds Act). 
79. See 22 Stat. at 31 ("[I]f any male person ... cohabits with more than one 
woman, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."). Today such a provision might 
be in violation of modern interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause inasmuch as it 
only targets males who cohabit, rather than females, or the people with whom they 
cohabit. 
80. Id. (emphasis added). 
81. Id. 
82. Harmer-Dionne, supra note 63, at 1329. As a result of the Edmunds Act, the 
Utah territorial penitentiary was "filled to overflowing with unrepentant polygamists," 
LDS leaders were forced into hiding, and other church members fled to Chihuahua, 
Mexico to seek asylum. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 240. 
83. Edmunds-Thcker (Polygamy) Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887). 
84. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 133. 
85. See 24 Stat. at 636. 
86. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 133; see 24 Stat. at 637-40 ("The ordinance 
of the so-called general assembly of the State of Deseret [Utah Territory] incorporating 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ... [is] hereby disapproved and an­
nulled, and the said corporation ... is hereby dissolved."). 
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ernment began to dissolve the LDS Church and to take possession 
of its assets.87 Litigation over the legality of the Edmunds-Tucker 
Act ensued. In Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter­
Day Saints v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the Ed­
munds-Tucker Act and declared, in dicta, that the LDS Church was 
a sect "contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization 
which Christianity has produced in the Western world."88 The 
Court also branded religious polygamy a "barbarous practice" and 
a "nefarious doctrine" that was "abhorrent to the sentiments and 
feelings of the civilized world."89 
Shortly after its decision in Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus 
Christ,90 the Supreme Court decided Davis v. Beason.91 In Davis, 
the Court declared the LDS Church to be a "cultus" whose belief in 
polygamy as a "tenet of religion ... offend [ ed] the common sense 
of mankind."92 The Davis Court further held that an oath man­
dated by the laws of the Territory of Idaho as a prerequisite for 
voting in Idaho was constitutional, even though it disfranchised all 
Latter-day Saints, regardless of whether they practiced, or even be­
lieved in, polygamy.93 As part of the Idaho oath, potential voters 
87. VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 133. 
88. 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890) (this case is often referred to as Mormon Church v. 
United States). But see Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14,26 (1946) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the use of polygamy has historically "far exceeded" other 
forms of marriage). "We must recognize, then," wrote Justice Murphy, "that polygyny, 
like other forms of marriage, is basically a cultural institution rooted deeply in the relig­
ious beliefs and social mores of those societies in which it appears." [d. at 26. Indeed, 
one source states that "[a] large majority-980 of the 1,154 past or present societies for 
which anthropologists have data-have allowed a man to have more than one wife .... 
[M]ore than 65 percent of today's world populations belong to a community that allows 
polygamy ...." ANDREA MOORE-EMMETT, Goo's BROTHEL 39 (2004) (citations 
omitted). 
89. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ, 136 U.S. at 48-49. 
90. According to one observer, the Court's action in Late Corp. of the Church of 
Jesus Christ allowing the federal government to dissolve a church was "an unprece­
dented event in American history." Gillett, supra note 74, at 518. 
91. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 634 (1996) (holding that Davis is no longer good law to the extent it "held that 
persons advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to vote," or to the extent 
"it held that the groups designated in the statute may be deprived of the right to vote 
because of their status"). 
92. Davis, 133 U.S. at 341-42. But see Harmer-Dionne, supra note 63, at 1298 
("Despite contemporaneous arguments to the contrary, polygamy met any measure or 
test of religious belief. "). 
93. Davis, 133 U.S. at 348. After Idaho became a state in 1890, its newly written 
constitution contained the following Anti-Mormon provision: 
No person is permitted to vote ... who is ... a bigamist or polygamist, or is 
living in what is known as patriarchal or celestial marriage, ... or who in any 
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had to swear that they were "not a member of any order, organiza­
tion or association which teaches" that polygamy is "a duty" or 
which "practices bigamy, polygamy or plural or celestial marriage as 
a doctrinal rite. "94 
Although the Edmunds-Tucker Act, reinforced by the Su­
preme Court's subsequent decisions in Davis and Late Corp. of the 
Church of Jesus Christ, dissolved the LDS Church, confiscated its 
assets, and imprisoned its leaders,95 the final blow to Mormon po­
lygamy came when Congress threatened to enact the Cullom-Stru­
ble Bill.96 The Cullom-Struble Bill "was intended to strip all Utah 
Mormons of their rights as American citizens."97 According to one 
of its drafters, the primary purpose of the Cullom-Struble Bill was 
"to wrest from the hands of the priesthood the political power 
which it had so long wrongfully usurped and shamefully abused."98 
On September 24, 1890, Wilford Woodruff, the President of the 
LDS Church, issued a "Manifesto," which officially ended the LDS 
Church's practice of polygamy.99 "Inasmuch as laws have been en­
acted by Congress forbidding plural marriages," Woodruff wrote, 
"which laws have been pronounced constitutional by the court of 
last resort, I hereby declare my intention to submit to those laws, 
manner, teaches, advises, counsels, aids or encourages any person to enter into 
bigamy, polygamy, or such patriarchal, plural, or celestial marriage, ... or who 
is a member of, or contributes to the support, aid or encouragement of, any 
order, organization, association, corporation, or society, which teaches, advises, 
counsels, encourages or aids any person to enter into bigamy, polygamy or 
such patriarchal or plural marriage .... 
IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (amended 1982) (emphasis added). For an interesting case 
interpreting this provision, see Toncray v. Budge, 95 P. 26 (Idaho 1908). From the lan­
guage of this provision, it seems that its purpose was not merely to exclude all 
polygamists from voting, but especially to exclude all Latter-day Saints (which made up 
a large percentage of the Idaho popUlation) from voting, whether or not they counte­
nanced polygamy. 
94. IDAHO TERR. REV. STAT. § 504 (1887) (emphasis added). Note that the stat­
ute specifically targeted "celestial" marriage. This language is significant because Lat­
ter-day Saints believe that marriages ("sealings"-all of which are monogamous today) 
performed within their temples may entitle them to live in the "celestial kingdom." 
DOcrRINE AND COVENANTS 131:1-4. 
95. Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitu­
tional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 14,25 (2003) (stating 
that more than 1,000 male Latter-day Saints were imprisoned). 
96. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 137. 
97. Id. (emphasis added). 
98. ROBERT N. BASKIN, REMINISCENCES OF EARLY UTAH (1914), available at 
http://www.antimormon.8m.com/baskinchpI5.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006). 
99. Wilford Woodruff, Official Declaration-I, in DOcrRINE AND COVENANTS. 
For more detailed information about the Manifesto, see ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 
267-75. 
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and to use my influence with the members of the Church over 
which I preside to have them do likewise."lOo Today, the LDS 
Church excommunicates members who themselves engage in or en­
courage others to engage in polygamy.lOl Nevertheless, various in­
dividuals who are unaffiliated with the LDS Church continue to 
practice polygamy in Utah,102 despite state laws that prohibit the 
practice.103 




As previously stated, the purpose of this article is to examine 
laws and court opinions from nineteenth-century America that 
targeted Mormon polygamy. By adding consideration of state 
Blaine Amendments to this examination, a more accurate under­
standing of the constitutionality of these anti-polygamy laws may be 
attained. Early anti-polygamy laws, like state Blaine Amendments, 
were the product of religious prejudice and intolerance. Thus, this 
article suggests that early anti-polygamy laws should be considered 
bad law today to the same extent that Blaine Amendments are so 
considered. 
To understand more fully the legal and factual bases behind 
this suggestion, the remainder of this section will probe current 
First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. This study will 
first briefly examine the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Es­
tablishment Clauses, and will then look at the Fourteenth Amend­
ment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Finally, this 
100. See Woodruff, supra note 99. 
101. See Gordon B. Hinckley, What Are People Asking About Us?, ENSIGN, Nov. 
1998, at 70 (affirming that the modern LDS Church "has nothing to do with those prac­
ticing polygamy"). 
102. See infra Part IV; see also MOORE-EMMETT, supra note 88 (describing many 
non-Mormon groups that continue to practice polygamy in Utah and surrounding ar­
eas). Perhaps the most well-known polygamist group in Utah today is the Fundamen­
talist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints ("FLDS"). See Nancy Perkins & 
Wendy Leonard, FLDS Leader Indicted on 2 Felony Counts: Did leffs Arrange Mar­
riage of Girl to a Married Man?, DESERET MORNING NEWS, June 11, 2005, at B1 (stat­
ing that "[s]ome 10,000 FLDS members practice plural marriage as a central tenet" of 
their religion). 
103. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (2005) (making bigamy a third-degree felony); 
see also State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004) (upholding constitutionality of bigamy 
conviction). As a condition for obtaining statehood on January 4, 1896, Utah's newly 
enacted constitution was required to provide that "[p]olygamous or plural marriages 
are forever prohibited." UTAH CONST. art. III (emphasis added). Note that this provi­
sion expressly singles out "plural marriages," a phrase the LDS Church coined. 
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study addresses the applicability these Clauses (except the Due 
Process Clause )104 to early anti-polygamy laws and contemporane­
ous state Blaine Amendments. 
A. The Free Exercise Clause: The Smith and Hialeah Decisions 
1. 	 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith 
Although the Supreme Court has constructed different tests 
over time for determining the constitutionality of laws under the 
Free Exercise Clause, the Court's decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith embodies the 
current test.1°5 In Smith, the Court upheld an Oregon statute that 
criminalized the use of peyote106 for any purpose, including for "re­
ligiously inspired" sacramental uses by Native Americans.1°7 The 
Smith Court held the Oregon statute to be constitutional because it 
was a law of general applicability that was neutral toward religion 
and did not present a "hybrid situation" involving the Free Exercise 
Clause in conjunction with another constitutional protection. lOB 
"We have never held," the Court explained, "that an individual's 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. "109 
As a result of the Court's decision in Smith, with the exception of 
104. Because the applicability of the Due Process Clause to state Blaine Amend­
ments is not readily apparent, this article will not address the constitutionality of Blaine 
Amendments under that clause. 
105. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), su­
perseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 
107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006)). Smith embodies the test for claims brought under the 
Free Exercise Clause. Smith has, however, been superseded by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993. Smith is not the test for statutory claims brought under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
106. Peyote is a stimulant drug. See peyote, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DIC­
TIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/peyote. 
107. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
108. Id. at 878-79, 881-82. 
109. Id. at 878-79. Contrary to the Smith Court's assertion, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, the Court held that an otherwise valid statute violated the Free Exercise Clause 
because the statute required all children-including Amish children-to attend school 
until age sixteen. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). Although the statute 
was one of general applicability and was neutral on its face, the Court held the statute 
to be unconstitutional because it affected a "sincere" and "fundamental belief' held by 
Amish people "that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart 
from the world and worldly influence." Id. at 209-10, 235. Interestingly, Justice Douglas 
dissented in Yoder, arguing that the majority's opinion was contrary to the Court's deci­
sion in Reynolds. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "What we do today," wrote Jus­
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"hybrid situations" involving the Free-Exercise Clause and another 
constitutional right, the Free Exercise Clause is no longer a valid 
basis (assuming it ever was 110) for claiming a religious exemption 
from a facially neutral law of general applicability.111 
2. 	 CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU A YE, INC. V. CITY OF 
HIALEAH 
Soon after its decision in Smith, the Supreme Court revisited 
and explained Smith in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah.112 Hialeah involved ordinances passed by a Florida 
municipality that prohibited practitioners of the Santeria113 religion 
from practicing their faith within city limits.114 One of the principal 
forms of Santeria worship is the offering of animal sacrifices.lls To 
inhibit the performance of such sacrifices, the city adopted ordi­
nances that effectively criminalized the killing of animals for ritual­
istic sacrifices, but permitted animal slaughter for purposes that the 
city considered to be more consistent" 'with public morals, peace or 
safety."'116 According to the Supreme Court, these ordinances 
were unconstitutional because they were neither facially neutral nor 
generally applicable, as required by Smith.117 Instead of being 
facially neutral and of general applicability, the ordinances imper­
missibly discriminated against the Santeria religion and "were pur­
sued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs."118 
"[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices be­
cause of their religious motivation," the Court explained, "the law 
is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling 
tice Douglas, "opens the way to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever 
enjoyed; and it even promises that in time Reynolds will be overruled." Id. 
110. See Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The 
History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CaNsT. L. 222, 224-25 (2003) (noting 
that even "[b]efore the post-World War II era, the religion clauses were almost tooth­
less in the United States Supreme Court," especially in protecting religious minorities). 
111. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 881-82. 
112. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
113. Santeria is "[a] religion [that was] practiced orig[inally] in Cuba in which 
[African] deities are identified with Roman Catholic saints." Santeria, MERRIAM-WEB· 
STER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/santeria. 
114. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 526-28. 
115. Id. at 524. Followers of Santeria sacrifice "chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, 
guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and turtles ... by the cutting of the carotid arteries .... The 
sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten, except after healing and death rituals." Id. at 525. 
116. Id. at 526-27 (quoting the City of Hialeah, Florida's Resolution 87-66 (June 
9, 1987)). 
117. Id. at 524. 
118. Id. 
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interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. "119 
3. 	 Implications of the Supreme Court's Decisions in Smith 
and Hialeah 
In analyzing the constitutionality of early anti-polygamy laws 
under the Free Exercise Clause, it is first necessary, according to 
Smith, to determine whether such laws are neutral and of general 
applicability.120 This determination, according to Hialeah, is made, 
at least in part, by looking at the laws' object and purpose. l2l If the 
object and purpose of a law is to target a practice because of its 
religious motivation, as in Hialeah, then the law is neither neutral 
nor of general applicability.122 Where a law is neither neutral nor 
of general applicability, strict scrutiny applies because the require­
ments of Smith are not satisfied.123 
A brief study of each of the anti-polygamy laws discussed in 
Part n.B suggests that these laws were neither neutral nor of gen­
eral applicability.124 Although one purpose of early anti-polygamy 
laws was no doubt to prevent everyone from practicing polygamy, 
the laws particularly targeted members of the LDS Church.125 For 
example, the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, which was the first federal 
law criminalizing polygamy, expressly targeted "spiritual mar­
riage"-a term often used by early Latter-day Saints to refer to po­
lygamy.126 In addition, the Morrill Act only applied to individuals 
living "in a Territory [rather than in a State] of the United States," 
which happened to be where most Latter-day Saints resided.127 Al­
though the Edmunds Act ignored married individuals living in adul­
tery, it attacked those who "believe[ d] it right" to have more than 
119. 	 Id. at 533 (citations omitted). 
120. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,878-79,881­
82 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
121. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 547. 
122. 	 [d. at 533, 547. 
123. [d. at 533 (requiring that a law be narrowly tailored to a compelling govern­
mental interest). 
124. 	 [d. 
125. Indeed, before the Latter-day Saints announced their approval of polygamy, 
no federal anti-polygamy law ever existed. Thus, it appears that "[t]he anti-polygamy 
laws ... were passed directly in response to the Mormon Church's public announce­
ment of its intent to practice polygamy." Stephanie Forbes, Comment, "Why Just Have 
One?"; An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws Under the Establishment Clause, 39 
Hous. L. REV. 1517, 1546 (2003). 
126. Ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501 (1862); see supra text accompanying notes 64-67. 
127. 12 Stat. at 501 (emphasis added). 
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one living spouse at the same time.128 The Edmunds-Tucker Act 
made it a crime to fail to record a marriage publicly and expressly 
dissolved the LDS Church because it was "contrary to the spirit of 
Christianity."129 The Idaho oath130 upheld in Davis v. Beason 131 
punished members of organizations that practiced "plural or celes­
tial marriage as a doctrinal rite."132 The Idaho Constitution prohib­
ited all people, regardless of whether they were polygamists, from 
voting if they belonged to an organization that encouraged "patriar­
chal, plural, or celestial marriage"-all terms coined by the Latter­
day Saints.133 Similarly, the Cullom-Struble Bill would have dis­
franchised all Utah Mormons, regardless of whether they believed 
in or practiced polygamy.134 
Thus, although the Morrill Act, the Edmunds Act, the Ed­
munds-Tucker Act, and similar statutory provisions may have af­
fected all people to some extent, they expressly targeted belief­
based polygamy and cohabitation. Because these laws "stem[ med] 
from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices," they must, 
pursuant to Smith and Hialeah, undergo strict scrutiny.135 To pass 
strict scrutiny, a law must be "justified by a compelling [governmen­
tal] interest and [be] narrowly tailored to advance that interest. "136 
If the governmental interests were chastity and the protection of 
morals, then these laws fail under a strict scrutiny test because 
lawmakers did not narrowly tailor the laws to those interests. 
128. Ch. 47, § 5, 22 Stat. 30, 31 (1882); see supra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
129. The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 
(1890); see also Ch. 397, § 17,24 Stat. 635, 638 (1887); VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 
117. Such a statement by the High Court not only has the practical effect of giving 
Christianity favored treatment, but also of portraying the Court as a theological body 
competent of determining what is, and is not, in accord with "the spirit of Christianity" 
(or of any other religion for that matter). Id. 
130. IDAHO TERR. REv. STAT. § 504 (1887). 
131. 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 
(1996). 
132. IDAHO TERR. REV. STAT. § 504; see supra text accompanying notes 93-94. 
133. IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (amended 1982). 
134. See VAN WAGONER, supra note 52, at 137. By stripping both monogamous 
and polygamous Latter-day Saints of their vote, anti-Mormon politicians would have 
been able to dominate elections in areas of heavy Mormon population. [d. Although 
the Cullom-Struble Bill was not passed, it likely would have passed had the Manifesto 
not been issued in 1890. See BASKIN, supra note 96. "Evidently [the Collum-Struble 
Bill's] pendency forced the issuance of the manifesto." [d. 
135. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993); 
see also Sealing, supra note 61, at 753 ("[T]hese laws and state constitutional provisions 
were aimed at a particular religious practice and therefore should be subject to strict 
scrutiny."). 
136. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533. 
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Rather, the laws only punished individuals who had, for religious 
reasons, more than one wife, while effectively ignoring those men 
who were married to one woman but were unfaithful to that 
woman.137 
Likewise, if the government's interest in enacting the anti-po­
lygamy laws was administrative in nature, such as for taxation, pro­
bate, or other estate planning purposes, these laws still fail strict 
scrutiny because they in no way helped to advance that interest.138 
The Latter-day Saints who entered into polygamous marriages did 
so in secret religious ceremonies that were not legally recorded or 
governmentally sanctioned; therefore, they did not receive or seek 
any governmental benefit.139 Even if the Latter-day Saints' polyga­
mous marriages were legally recognized, there still were no tax ben­
efits. First, Utah was only a territory at the time Mormon polygamy 
existed, and thus under the federal government's exclusive con­
troJ.140 Second, the Sixteenth Amendment, which empowered Con­
gress to tax income, was not ratified until 1913, twenty-three years 
after the LDS Church stopped advocating polygamy.141 Further, it 
was not until 1935, long after Woodruff issued his Manifesto, that 
Congress passed the Social Security Act.142 Therefore, because 
these nineteenth-century anti-polygamy laws were neither based 
upon a compelling governmental interest, nor narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest, they are constitutionally invalid under strict 
scrutiny.143 
Although the applicability of the Free Exercise Clause to 
Blaine Amendments is somewhat more tenuous than that of early 
anti-polygamy laws, to the extent that the Blaine Amendments can 
137. See Sealing, supra note 61, at 736 ("[T]he various anti-polygamy statutes and 
constitutional provisions attack only the religiously based practice of polygamy but ig· 
nore a host of threats to the supposedly compelling interest of maintaining the tradi­
tional Christian monogamous family unit as the basic building block of society. "). 
138. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12. 
139. As observed by one commentator, "[p]eople living in polygamous relation­
ships do not gain benefits from the government due to their status. The existence of 
marriages that exist only in the eyes of God does not harm or burden society." Gillett, 
supra note 74, at 531. "According to the United States government, the marriages do 
not exist." Id. at 532. 
140. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, d. 2(2). 
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Taxation, MSN Encarta, http://encarta. 
msn.com!encydopedia_761573037_7rraxation.html#p87. 
142. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current version at 42 V.S.c. §§ 301-1397jj 
(2000»; see text accompanying note 97. 
143. That is not to say that modern anti-polygamy laws could not survive strict 
scrutiny. See infra Part IV. 
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be shown to inhibit modern Catholics from freely practicing their 
religious beliefs, they may be unconstitutional as well. Assuming 
that the Blaine Amendments are state-imposed impediments to 
Catholics' free-exercise rights, under Smith and Hialeah, the 
Amendments must undergo strict scrutiny if they are not neutral 
and of general applicability.144 A brief glance at the history of 
Blaine Amendments shows that they were not neutral, because they 
targeted "sectarian" (or Catholic) schools.145 Like the city ordi­
nances struck down in Hialeah, Blaine Amendments originally 
lacked general applicability; that is, they were under-inclusive be­
cause they only affected Catholic influence in public schools while 
Protestant influence was unrestricted.146 Thus, under strict scrutiny 
analysis, Blaine Amendments must be narrowly tailored to advance 
a compelling governmental interest.147 
Arguably the states' interest in enacting Blaine Amendments 
was to guard against the establishment of a religion under the Es­
tablishment Clause. While "[t]here is no doubt that compliance 
with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently com­
pelling to" satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny, Blaine 
Amendments fail strict scrutiny because they are not narrowly tai­
lored to advance that interest.148 Additionally, because the states' 
real interest in enacting Blaine Amendments appears to have been 
to prevent the spread of Catholicism in the United States, the gov­
ernment's interest is not compelling.149 
B. The Establishment Clause: Mitchell, Locke, and Lemon 
1. Mitchell v. Helms 
In Mitchell v. Helms,150 the Supreme Court held that a federal 
program that channeled funds to both public and private schools 
144. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79, 
881-82 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. 
L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
145. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 16, 31, and 32 and accompanying text; see also Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543-45 (1993) (explaining that the 
city of Hialeah's ordinances restricting animal sacrifice were not laws of general appli­
cability because they were under-inclusive). 
147. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533. 
148. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). 
149. See supra Part 1. 
150. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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did not violate the Establishment Clause.151 Although there was no 
majority opinion, the plurality in Mitchell acknowledged that "there 
was a period when ['whether a school that receives aid ... is perva­
sively sectarian'] mattered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian 
school was a primary or secondary school. But that period is one 
that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past."152 In 
further referring to this period in history, the plurality mentioned 
the federal Blaine Amendment and said, "[H]ostility to aid to per­
vasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not 
hesitate to disavow. . . . Consideration of the [Blaine] 
[A ]mendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic 
Church and to Catholics in general .... This doctrine, born of big­
otry, should be buried now."153 As far as the Mitchell plurality was 
concerned, further propagation of the religious animus embodied 
within the Blaine Amendment should be prevented.154 
2. Locke v. Davey 
Although the plurality opinion in Mitchell failed to command a 
majority, a majority of the Court in Locke v. Davey subsequently 
suggested that "baby Blaine [A]mendments" might be unconstitu­
tional.155 In Locke, the Court considered whether. the State of 
Washington could constitutionally "assist academically gifted stu­
dents with postsecondary education expenses," while, in accordance 
with the state's constitution, prohibiting assistance to students seek­
ing a degree in devotional theology.156 While the Locke Court held 
that "such an exclusion from an otherwise inclusive aid program" 
did not violate the federal Constitution, the Court alluded to the 
possibility that its holding may have been otherwise had the plain­
tiff established "a credible connection between the Blaine Amend­
ment and ... the relevant [state] constitutional provision."157 
Because the plaintiff had failed to make such a connection, and be­
151. Id. at 801. 
152. Id. at 826 (citation omitted). The plurality's position, however, lacks prece­
dential value. "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale ex­
plaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds ....'" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976». 
153. Id. .at 828-29. 
154. Id. at 829. 
155. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 723 n.7 (2004). 
156. Id. at 715. 
157. Id. at 723 n.7. For additional commentary on the Blaine Amendment and 
the Washington Constitution, see Mark Edward DeForrest, Locke v. Davey: The Con­
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cause the Court could not find "in the history or text of" the state 
constitutional provision "anything that suggests animus towards re­
ligion," the Locke Court decided that "the provision in question 
[was] not a Blaine Amendment. "158 The Court declined further 
consideration of the issue because "the Blaine Amendment's his­
tory [was] simply not before" the Court at that time.159 
3. Implications of Mitchell and Locke 
Explicitly in Mitchell and implicitly in Locke, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the motivation behind the Blaine Amend­
ments was animosity against Catholics.160 Although the Locke 
Court was not as emphatic in denouncing Blaine Amendments as 
was the plurality in Mitchell, the Locke Court's dicta appears to 
have recognized that Blaine Amendments may merit special atten­
tion if properly presented to the Court for consideration.161 In both 
Mitchell and Locke the Court recognized that animosity toward re­
ligion is key to any constitutional analysis of state Blaine Amend­
ments.162 According to Locke, such animosity may be found in 
either the history or the text of Blaine Amendment provisions.163 
Thus, when looking at the history surrounding the federal Blaine 
Amendment, the Mitchell plurality suggested that state Blaine 
Amendments should be disfavored because they sprang from "a 
shameful pedigree" that was "born of bigotry" and hostility against 
the Catholic Church. l64 
Early anti-polygamy laws should be struck down for the same 
reasons that certain Justices in Mitchell and Locke criticized state 
Blaine Amendments. This is because early anti-polygamy laws, like 
state Blaine Amendments, were also "born of bigotry" and "a 
shameful pedigree."165 As explained in Parts II and III.A.3, the his­
torical record suggests that early anti-polygamy laws may not have 
arisen so much out of a dislike for polygamy as out of a hatred for 
nection Between the Federal Blaine Amendment and Article /, § 11 of the Washington 
State Constitution, 40 TULSA L. REV. 295 (2004). 
158. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725, 723 n.7. 
159. Id. 
160. See id.; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000). 
161. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 723 n.7. 
162. See id.; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29. 
163. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725. 
164. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29 (citing Green, supra note 5, for historical 
support). 
165. Id. 
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the LDS Church and its leaders.166 For example, long before the 
Church adopted polygamy, Latter-day Saints in Missouri and Illi­
nois were murdered, raped, and exiled by neighbors and govern­
ment officials.167 With approval from federal and state 
governments alike in 1846, early Latter-day Saints were forced to 
leave the then-existing confines of the United States to seek refuge 
in what was then a part of Mexico.168 Unwilling to leave the belea­
guered group alone, President James Buchanan later sent 2,500 
troops to the Utah Territory to put down a Mormon "insurrection" 
that, in fact, never existed.169 Furthermore, before the Latter-day 
Saints announced their practice of polygamy, no federal anti-polyg­
amy law existed.170 Indeed, nearly ten years passed from the time 
the LDS Church officially adopted polygamy and the time the fed­
eral government enacted the first anti-polygamy law.171 As ex­
plained in Part IILA.3, subsequent federal statutes made it clear 
that the government's interest in prohibiting polygamy was not mo­
tivated so much by concern for public chastity and morals, but was 
instead based upon an intense desire to destroy an unruly and polit­
ically unpopular religion. l72 Therefore, to the extent that early anti­
polygamy laws really were the product of animus against the LDS 
Church, they, like state Blaine Amendments, "should be buried 
now" for the reasons explained in Mitchell and hinted at in 
Locke.173 
4. The Lemon Test 
Although the vitality and relevance of the Lemon I74 test has 
been questioned almost since its inception in 1971,175 "[l]ike some 
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its 
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, 
Lemon [continues to] stalk[] Establishment Clause jurispru­
166. See supra Parts II, IILA.3. 
167. See supra Part II.A. 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50. 
169. For more on the so-called "Mormon War" and "Buchanan's Blunder," see 
supra note 63. 
170. See supra notes 55, 64 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra Part IILA.3. 
173. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,723 n.7 (2004); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793, 829 (2000). 
174. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
175. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
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dence."176 Under the traditional Lemon test, state action violates 
the Establishment Clause unless it 1) has a secular purpose, 2) has a 
principal or primary effect "that neither advances nor inhibits relig­
ion," and 3) does "not foster 'an excessive government entangle­
ment with religion.' "177 Although an in-depth analysis of the 
constitutionality of state Blaine Amendments and early anti-polyg­
amy laws under the Lemon test is beyond the scope of this article, 
both types of legislative enactments appear to be in violation of the 
Lemon Court's "effect" prong.178 
In recent years, a majority of the Supreme Court has reformu­
lated the Lemon's "effect" prong as precluding the "endorsement 
or disapproval" of religion.179 A determination of impermissible 
government endorsement depends upon whether a reasonable ob­
server would view the government as conveying a "message that 
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."180 
In light of the above analysis of the state Blaine Amendments and 
early anti-polygamy laws, a reasonable observer would likely view 
both types of laws as disfavoring Catholicism and Mormonism, re­
spectively, while at the same time favoring and endorsing main­
stream Protestantism.181 Religious prejudice motivated both types 
of laws, and had the effect of impeding the progress of the Catholic 
and LDS churches. For these reasons, it is likely that state Blaine 
Amendments and early anti-polygamy laws violate modern inter­
pretations of the Establishment Clause under both the Lemon and 
"endorsement" tests. 
C. The Equal Protection Clause: Romer v. Evans 
The Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans182 struck down an 
amendment to Colorado's state constitution because it violated the 
176. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
177. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted). 
178. See id. at 612. For an in-depth look at the Supreme Court's current Estab­
lishment Clause jurisprudence, see Elijah L. Milne, Protecting Islam's Garden from the 
Wilderness: Halal Fraud Statutes and the First Amendment, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL'y (forth­
coming June 2006). 
179. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(enunciating the so-called "endorsement test"); see County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (formally adopting the "en­
dorsement test"). 
180. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. at 593 (citations omitted). 
181. See supra Part III.B.3. 
182. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.183 The 
Colorado legislature adopted the amendment, which was the prod­
uct of a statewide referendum, to repeal certain city ordinances that 
forbade discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.184 Ac­
cording to the Court, the amendment also "prohibit [ ed] alliegisla­
tive, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local 
government designed to protect [homosexuals]'''185 Because the 
Romer Court viewed the amendment as "inexplicable by anything 
but animus toward the class it affects," and because "it lack[ed] a 
rational relationship to legitimate state interests," the amendment 
was struck down for singling out individuals by a "single trait and 
then deny[ing] them protection across the board."186 Equal Protec­
tion, the Court explained, "at the very least mean[s] that a bare ... 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a le­
gitimate governmental interest. "187 
According to one commentator, "the Supreme Court's decision 
in Romer suggests that at a minimum any Blaine Amendment is 
constitutionally suspect."188 Based on the Romer Court's reason­
ing, state Blaine Amendments are in violation of the Equal Protec­
tion Clause because the amendment is based upon a "desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group."189 To the extent that such an 
amendment is "inexplicable by anything but animus,"190 the state 
amendment is unconstitutional. 
According to the historical record, the federal Blaine Amend­
ment surfaced during an era in which many considered "Rum, 
Romanism, and Rebellion" to be contrary to the nation's spirit, re­
ligion, and morals.191 Although the federal Blaine Amendment 
merely sought to distance the government from sectarianism, it was 
no secret at that time that "sectarian" only meant Catholic.192 In­
deed, while the federal Blaine Amendment decried the use of state 
funds in connection with private schools, Congress drafted the 
Amendment in such a manner as to protect Protestant prayers, 
183. Id. at 623. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 623-24. 
186. Id. at 633. 
187. Id. at 634 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973». 
188. Bacon, supra note 11, at 34. 
189. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
190. Id. at 632. 
191. See supra Part II. 
192. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000). 
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hymns, and Bible reading in public schools.193 In other words, 
while separation of church and state may have been the banner 
around which proponents of the national Blaine Amendment ral­
lied, suppression of the Catholic Church was the predominant 
purpose. 
Therefore, to the extent that it can be established from the his­
tory of Blaine Amendments that animus against a particular relig­
ion, i.e., Catholicism, was the primary motivation for their 
enactment, "the rational relationship test cannot be properly ap­
plied to [state] Blaine Amendment[s], based as [they are] on the 
religious nature of the schools affected thereby."194 Rather, strict 
scrutiny applies when reviewing state Blaine Amendments, accord­
ing to the Court's combined holdings in Smith and Hialeah, because 
a law is not neutral and of general applicability if suppression of 
religion is the law's object and target,195 And, as explained in Part 
III.A.3, that standard cannot be satisfied here because Blaine 
Amendments are not narrowly tailored to compelling government 
interests.196 
Under Romer, the prohibition of religiously motivated polyg­
amy may be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as are the 
state Blaine Amendments and the Colorado amendment. Anti-po­
lygamy laws almost exclusively affected Latter-day Saints because 
individuals living in other adulterous situations were left largely un­
hampered by the laws, and thus, the laws were "born of animosity 
toward the class of persons affected. "197 These laws made a legal 
distinction between the unrecorded "spiritual"198 or "celestial"199 
marriages of Latter-day Saints, and the cohabitation of persons with 
someone other than a legal spouse.200 To the extent anti-polygamy 
laws made this distinction, they, like state Blaine Amendments, vio­
late the Equal Protection Clause. 
D. The Due Process Clause: Lawrence 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that private, 
193. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
194. Bacon, supra note 11, at 38. 
195. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); 
see supra Part lILA. 
196. See supra Part IILA.3. 
197. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); see supra Parts IILA.3, III.B. 
198. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862). 
199. IDAHO TERR. REV. STAT. § 504 (1887). 
200. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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consensual sodomy among homosexual adults is a form of liberty 
that, based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, is entitled to protection from criminal prosecution.201 
"[L]iberty," the Court affirmed, "gives substantial protection to 
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat­
ters pertaining to sex,"202 marriage, and family relationships.203 Be­
cause the Texas statute in Lawrence only criminalized homosexual 
sodomy performed by consenting adults, the Court held the statute 
to be in violation of the Due Process Clause.204 "The State cannot 
demean [homosexuals'] existence or control their destiny by mak­
ing their private sexual conduct a crime," the Court explained.205 
"Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the 
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government. "206 
Although Lawrence did not address the right of individuals to 
marry, the application of Lawrence to early anti-polygamy laws is 
both readily apparent and controversial.207 If homosexuals have a 
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in not being crimi­
nally prosecuted for their sexual conduct, it would seem that con­
senting adults desiring to engage in religious polygamy also should 
be entitled to such a liberty interest. Nevertheless, for some people, 
201. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 567 (2003). Quoting an earlier deci­
sion, the Lawrence Court declared, "'If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.'" Id. at 565 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972» (emphasis in original). 
202. Id. at 572. 
203. Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992». 
204. Id. at 575. "If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so 
remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were 
not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons .... The stigma this criminal 
statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial." Id. 
205. Id. at 578. 
206. Id. (emphasis added). 
207. The Court has stated "[i]n a long line of cases ... [that] the 'liberty' specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry; to have children; to 
direct the education and upbringing of one's children; to marital privacy; to use contra­
ception; to bodily integrity[;] and to abortion." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
720 (1997) (citations omitted). Regardless, in light of the fact that most religious 
polygamists today (as well as nineteenth-century Mormon polygamists) are indifferent 
to the government's (non) recognition of their inherently spiritual relationships, the fact 
that Lawrence did not directly address the marriage question is irrelevant because, as 
stated elsewhere in this article, polygamists are only seeking to be left alone to practice 
their religious lifestyle. They are not necessarily seeking to have the government recog­
nize their unions as "marriages." See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text. 
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"[t]he comparison [of polygamy] to same sex couples remains a bi­
zarre juxtaposition. "208 As one commentator has written, "Polyg­
amy is about one powerful man collecting a submissive harem of 
women as property," while "[h]omosexuality is about the sexual 
orientation of two committed equal partners asking for the same 
rights ... as are given to ... heterosexual couples. "209 Other com­
mentators concede, however, that "there is a justifiable question as 
to where polygamy statutes stand after Lawrence ,"210 yet argue 
nonetheless that there are additional reasons for outlawing polyg­
amy.211 For example, commentators often state that by legalizing 
polygamy, polygamists would receive added governmental benefits, 
such as those relating to estate planning issues, which are not other­
wise available to monogamous persons.212 But, as was explained in 
Part III.A.3, most polygamists are not seeking state recognition of 
their relationships.213 Instead, most polygamists merely desire to 
be left alone to live their lives and their religions as they please.214 
Because unrecorded polygamous marriages "exist only in the eyes 
of God," they neither "harm [n]or burden society."215 
Recognizing the similarities between homosexual and polyga­
mous relationships, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Thomas, dissented in Lawrence, arguing that "laws 
against bigamy" were "called into question by" the Court's decision 
in Lawrence.216 "If, as the Court asserts," Justice Scalia wrote, "the 
promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate 
state interest," then laws against polygamy cannot even "survive ra­
tional-basis review. "217 Despite Justice Scalia's observations con­
208. MOORE-EMMETf, supra note 88, at 38. 
209. Id. 
210. Joseph Bozzuti, Note, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After 
Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH. LAW. 409,431 (2004). 
211. Id. at 431-33. 
212. See supra Part III.A.3. 
213. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. This does not necessarily 
mean that polygamists would not like state recognition of their relationships, but that 
they are generally indifferent to the matter as long as they may live as they please, free 
of governmental intrusions. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. 
214. See, e.g., Petti Fong, Utah Pushes B.C. to Act on Polygamous Group: Flow of 
Women to Bountiful Sparks Concern, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 2, 2005, at AI, 
A12 (stating that many polygamists "just want to be left alone"). 
215. Gillett, supra note 74, at 531-32. 
216. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see 
Cheryl Wetzstein, The Marriage of Many: If Homosexuals Can 'Wed,' Will Polygamists 
Be Next?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11,2005, at AOl, A05 (addressing both sides of the legal 
issue). 
217. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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cerning the similarities between laws prohibiting homosexuality and 
those prohibiting polygamy, at least one important difference exists: 
laws forbidding polygamy can also prevent polygamists from prac­
ticing their religious beliefs. Indeed, in the nineteenth-century, 
anti-polygamy laws expressly targeted individuals who lived the po­
lygamous lifestyle because of their religious beliefs.218 Thus, regard­
less of the similar liberty interests shared by homosexuals and 
polygamists, people practicing polygamy for religious purposes ar­
guably have not only a liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause in matters pertaining to sex, but also an additional liberty 
interest in matters of religious belief. This observation is not meant 
to infer that polygamists' religious beliefs alone would allow them 
to trump the states' interests in regulating marriage, but rather to 
demonstrate the existence of polygamists' multiple interests that 
hang in the constitutional balance. Not only are these multiple in­
terests worthy of substantial weight in any due process analysis; 
they may also constitute a "hybrid situation" justifying the applica­
tion of strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, as explained 
in Smith.219 




A. Arguments For Anti-Polygamy Laws 
Regardless of the animosity and bigotry which may have in­
spired early anti-polygamy laws, today, there are many valid rea­
sons for upholding and sustaining these laws-especially in light of 
the fact that any alleged animosity against the LDS Church has less­
ened.22o The same is true of state Blaine Amendments. Referring 
218. See supra Part III.A.3. 
219. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 
(1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (providing possible exception for "hybrid 
situations"); see also supra Part III.A.I. Additionally, outlawing polygamous cohabita­
tion may implicate polygamists' rights to association under the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment. But see Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) 
("To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment's expressive as­
sociational right, we must determine whether the group engages in 'expressive associa­
tion."'). Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
220. See David Van Biema, Kingdom Come: Salt Lake City Was Just for Starters­
The Mormons' True Great Trek Has Been to Social Acceptance and a $30 Billion Church 
Empire, TIME, Aug. 4, 1997 (stating that "although the Mormon faith remains unique, 
the land in which it was born has come to accept-no, to lionize-its adherents as 
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to these Amendments, one scholar noted: 
[T]oday there are other principles [besides hostility towards Ca­
tholicism] that may support the substance of the so-called Blaine 
[A]mendments .... The motivations of ... parties who sue to 
prevent government funding of religious entities, may have noth­
ing to do with enmity or hostility toward religion .... 
. . . Unless the government entity ... demonstrates a negative 
intent or attitude toward religion ... there is no proof of hostility 
toward religion. Disparate treatment in this context does not 
equate to hostility [toward religion] because those engaging in 
that treatment are often motivated by constitutional concerns or 
concerns for avoiding divisiveness in the community, rather than 
hostility toward religion.221 
In other words, despite any earlier motivations for the enact­
ment of Blaine Amendments, today there are purer reasons for up­
holding those Amendments, such as interests in the separation of 
church and state as well as concerns about religious tolerance and 
respect. While laws based upon bigotry should be constitutionally 
suspect, to the extent that they are purged of biases and clothed 
with other secular, impartial purposes, such laws need not be cast 
aside. 
Likewise, today there are many legitimate reasons for uphold­
ing the substance of federal and state anti-polygamy laws.222 Mod-
paragons of the national spirit," and that Mormons have gone from being "vilified" to 
"venerated"). 
221. Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court's Rhetorical Hostility: What Is "Hos­
tile" to Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1031, 1045-47 
(2004) (emphases added). 
222. Really the only federal laws regarding bigamy in existence today have to do 
with immigration to the United States and transportation of persons in interstate com­
merce for sexual activity. See, e.g., 8 U.S.c. §§ 1154, 1182 (2000) (dealing with the pro­
cedures for granting immigrant status); 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000) (dealing with human 
trafficking, but not specifically addressing bigamy). But Congress has specifically pro­
hibited "[t]he contracting of polygamous or plural marriages" in the Virgin Islands and 
the District of Columbia. See 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-501 (Lex­
isNexis 2005). All states currently have laws prohibiting polygamy or bigamy. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 13A-13-1 (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.140 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-3606 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-201 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 281­
283 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-201 to -203 (LexisNexis 2005); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53a-190 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1001-1003 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 826.01 to .03 (LexisNexis 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-20 to -21 (2003); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 709-900 (LexisNexis 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-1101 to -1103 
(2004); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5111-12 to 111-13 (LexisNexis 2005); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-46-1-2 (LexisNexis 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.1 (LexisNexis 2005); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-3601 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.010 (LexisNexis 1999); LA. 
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ern anti-polygamy statutes that were not motivated by religious bias, 
but by purer principles, should be able to withstand even the strict­
est form of constitutional scrutiny.223 For example, laws that target 
societal problems that some polygamous societies allegedly con­
done and perpetuate, such as crimes against women, children, and 
nonbelievers,224 should be constitutional to the extent that the ob­
ject of such laws is not to "restrict [these] practices because of their 
religious motivation."225 Because such laws are of general applica­
bility (i.e., they encompass both religionists and nonbelievers) and 
are in fact neutral toward religion, as required by Smith,226 they 
should be constitutional because states have a compelling interest 
in protecting their citizenry and advancing important societal pur­
poses. In sum, the government's motivation in enacting laws 
prohibiting polygamy is key: while bigotry should be disallowed, re­
ligious tolerance should be embraced. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:76-77 (2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 551 (1983); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-502 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 15 (2004); 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 750.439-.441 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.355 (LexisNexis 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-29-13 to -15 (1994); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 568.010 (LexisNexis 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-611 to -612 (2005); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 28-701 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.160-.170 (LexisNexis 2005); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 639:1 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1 (West 2005); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 30-10-1 (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (McKinney 2000); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-13 (1997); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2919.01 (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 881-884 (LexisNexis 
2005); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.515 (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4301 (West 1983); 
R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-1 (2002); S.c. CODE ANN. § 16-15-10 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-22-15 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-301 (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 25.01 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-101 to -101.5 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, §§ 206-208 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-43 (2004); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.64.01O (LexisNexis 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2005); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.05 (LexisNexis 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-401 (2005). Simi­
larly, polygamy is prohibited in Guam and Puerto Rico. GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 9, 
§ 31.10 (1996); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, §§ 4141-4142 (2001). 
223. The determination of whether the justification for a particular state or fed­
eral statute is one of "purer principles," as opposed to religious bias, is very fact-specific 
and turns largely upon the history and circumstances surrounding enactment and en­
forcement of the statute. To the extent that a court determines that the basis of a par­
ticular statute is that of religious animus, as were state Blaine Amendments, it should 
be invalidated. 
224. See Canada's Concern Is Sect Sex Crimes, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Dec. 
13, 2005, at B07; Tapestry Against Polygamy, http://www.polygamy.orglmedia.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2006). See generally JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF 
HEAVEN: A STORY OF VIOLENT FAITH (2003). 
225. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. V. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
226. See supra Part III.A.I. 
289 2006] BLAINE AMENDMENTS 
B. Arguments Against Anti-Polygamy Laws 
Despite the government's present motivations and interests in 
enacting laws prohibiting polygamy, early anti-polygamy laws still 
extant today, including provisions of Utah's state constitution227 
and the United States Supreme Court decisions in Reynolds and 
Late Corp. of the Church ofJesus Christ,228 continue to demean the 
lives of Latter-day Saints. The history of these early laws helps ex­
plain why.229 
"[T]he history of prejudice in matters of religion," wrote one 
commentator, "is analogous to . . . such history in matters of 
race."230 Early anti-polygamy laws, as well as state Blaine Amend­
ments, were an outgrowth of the same era as the Supreme Court's 
now-derided decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.231 In Plessy, the Court 
expressly upheld the doctrine of "separate but equal" as applied to 
racial segregation in the states.232 The one-eighth African Ameri­
can petitioner in Plessy had been imprisoned for refusing to vacate 
a seat on a train where only white passengers were to be accommo­
dated.233 He argued that the law under which he had been impris­
oned was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing 
slavery, because the Louisiana law "implied a legal inferiority" of 
African Americans and thereby imposed a "badge of slavery or ser­
vitude" on them.234 Rejecting this argument, the Plessy Court in­
stead declared that "[i]f this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put 
that construction upon it."235 
Building upon this idea of "badge[ s] of inferiority" described in 
227. See supra note 103. 
228. United States v. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ, 150 U.S. 145 
(1893); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
229. See supra Parts II, I11.A.3. Congress repealed the Edmunds Act on Decem­
ber 8,1983. 
230. Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J.L. & POL. 7, 29 (2002) 
[hereinafter Hamburger, Interpretation]. 
231. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). The Court decided Plessy just twenty years after Congressman James G. Blaine 
submitted his amendment to the U.S. House of Representatives, and only six years after 
former LDS President Wilford Woodruff issued his "Manifesto" abolishing polygamy. 
See supra text accompanying notes 28, 99. 
232. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51. 
233. Id. at 538-39. 
234. Id. at 542, 545. 
235. Id. at 551. Dissenting in Plessy, Justice Harlan argued that "if this statute of 
Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the State re­
quire the separation in railroad coaches of ... Protestants and Roman Catholics?" Id. at 
558 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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Plessy,236 the Court in Lawrence recognized that laws criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy likely violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
even if those laws are not enforced, because they "demean[] the 
lives of homosexual[s]" and impose upon them a criminal "stigma" 
which "is not trivial."237 Like the stigmas discussed in Plessy and 
Lawrence, Catholics and Latter-day Saints are stigmatized by the 
continued existence and application of laws that were originally 
motivated by hatred for them and their faith. This is so because, 
"where improper animus seems to have contributed to the initial 
drawing of the line, it is at least fair to argue that the line would not 
be where it is but for that animus. "238 
State Blaine Amendments, by their very existence, continue to 
demean the lives of Catholics. Although the animus embodied 
within those amendments may no longer exist, their "history shows 
that the adoption of separation as a constitutional standard was the 
product of deep-seated prejudice."239 The prejudice embodied in 
Blaine Amendments is still propagated by them, even though "sep­
aration is today typically supported by persons without animus to­
ward Catholic or other ecclesiastical authority."24o This is the case 
because "the separation of church and state still imposes elements 
of an historical discrimination."241 Therefore, to the extent that the 
state Blaine Amendments continue to impose stigmatic badges of 
bigotry upon Catholics, those Amendments should now be wholly 
discarded and replaced with laws untainted by discrimination. 
The same should also be done with the existing remnants of the 
government's attack against early Latter-day Saints. Although 
"polygamists [today] do not face the same animus that their prede­
cessors did,"242 the present existence of laws that were inspired by 
that original animus demeans the lives of Latter-day Saints by per­
petuating the idea that they are a disfavored organization. The con­
tinued viability of Supreme Court decisions such as Reynolds serve 
as a reminder to all modern-day Mormons that theirs is a despised 
236. Id. at 551. 
237. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). Although the Lawrence Court 
struck down the Texas statute at issue in that case on Due Process grounds, the Court 
recognized that "declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause" 
was "a tenable argument." Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
238. Paul E. Salamanca, Choice Programs and Market-Based Separationism, 50 
BUFF. L. REV. 931, 956 (2002). 
239. Hamburger, Interpretation, supra note 230, at 30. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Gillett, supra note 74, at 529. 
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religion, even though the LDS Church now eschews polygamy.243 
The continued citation of these decisions as precedent,244 based as 
they were upon animosity and bigotry, is a blight upon democratic 
ideals and enlightened concepts of tolerance and individual/relig­
ious liberty. To the extent that decisions such as Reynolds and Late 
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ were motivated by animosity 
against a particular religion, and continue to perpetuate that ani­
mosity, those holdings, like Plessy, should be overruled or struck 
down. Instead of favorably citing these opinions in free-exercise 
cases, the Court could instead, on its own initiative as it did with the 
Davis case in Romer v. Evans ,245 invalidate their precedential value 
to the extent the decisions target a particular religion. "A Supreme 
Court case born of prejudice is equally wrong whether it is based 
upon the racism of the era, as was, for example, Plessy v. Ferguson, 
or of anti-Mormon near-hysteria, as [were] Reynolds" and Late 
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ.246 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article was to examine state and federal 
laws and court decisions from nineteenth-century America that di­
rectly target Mormon polygamy. By adding to this examination 
consideration of state Blaine Amendments, a greater understanding 
of the constitutionality of these anti-polygamy laws hopefully has 
243. In support of this argument, consider the following remarks by LDS legal 
commentator Harmer-Dionne: "I was not alone in feeling palpable shock that the 
United States Supreme Court favorably cited Reynolds in its controversial decision in 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith. . .. [T]he Court in Smith affirma­
tively approved a decision [Reynolds] that upheld an oppressive law." Harmer-Dionne, 
supra note 63, at 1296-97. The Supreme Court has cited Reynolds in a positive light in 
many cases. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
535 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600-01 (1992); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 
1025, 1037 n.12 (1984); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (1947); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 190 (1946); 
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946). The Supreme Court has also cited 
Late Corp. of the Church ofJesus Christ in a positive way many times. See, e.g., Alfred 
L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 54 n.7 (1957); Kedroff v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119-20 (1952); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 
U.S. 428, 436 n.6 (1951); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946); Christian­
son v. King County, 239 U.S. 356, 366 (1915); Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic 
Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 323 (1908); Mont. Catholic Missions v. Missoula 
County, 200 U.S. 118, 128 (1906). 
244. See supra note 241. 
245. See supra note 91. 
246. Sealing, supra note 61, at 758. 
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been achieved. Nineteenth-century anti-polygamy laws, like state 
Blaine Amendments, were motivated primarily by religious 
prejudice and intolerance. So, "[i]f the history of the Blaine 
[A ]mendments renders them unconstitutional regardless of any 
nondiscriminatory purposes they may currently serve, then surely 
the history of the anti-polygamy laws would render them unconsti­
tutional as well. "247 Both types of laws were arguably the product of 
the same prejudice, the same bigotry, and the same thinly clad ani­
mosity. As such, neither type of law can survive strict scrutiny. To 
the extent that the motivation for the passage of these laws was 
animus, and due to the fact that the laws continue to stigmatize 
modern Catholics and Latter-day Saints, the time has now come for 
both types of laws to be forsaken. 
247. Ravitch, supra note 7, at 264. 
